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Diamond v. Chakrabarty: Oil Eaters:
Alive and Patentable
Congress is empowered, under article I, section 8 of the United States
Constitution, to create patent laws that encourage the promotion of arts
and sciences. In the congressional fulfilment of this task, the courts have
been confused as to what products are worthy of patent protection under
the patent statutes. One illustration of this confusion is the recent contro-
versy of whether living organisms fit into the statutory patentable classifi-
cation of section 101 of the 1952 Patent Act. The recent United States
Supreme Court decision of Diamond v. Chakrabarty has ended this confu-
sion by holding that living microbacteria is patentable as a "manufacture"
or "composition of matter" under section 101. The author makes an ex-
haustive survey of the areas of confusion surrounding interpretation of the
patent statutes and analyzes the Chakrabarty decision from the perspec-
tive of resolving these areas of confusion. The author ultimately agrees
with the decision, but notes that although the confusion in this area is
abated, the controversy still remains.
I. INTRODUCTION
As the scope of man's industrial and scientific technologies
broaden, so must the law which protects the endeavors of those
responsible for attaining these advancements. Nowhere has this
been more evident than in the recent Supreme Court case of Dia-
mond v. Chakrabarty,' where the Court, in a five-to-four decision,
held that living, man-made microbacteria is statutorily protected
subject matter under the United States Patent Act.2 This case
comment will examine both the facts and procedural background
of the Chakrabarty decision. The historical background of rele-
vant case law and statutes will also be examined in an effort to
show the propriety of the Supreme Court's opinion. Finally, the
Chakrabarty decision will be analyzed from the perspectives of
adherence to precedent and future benefits to the scientific and
business communities.
II. FACTS OF THE CASE
In 1972, Ananda M. Chakrabarty, a microbiologist, filed for a pat-
1. 100 S. Ct. 2204 (1980).
2. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1976) states: "Whoever invents or discovers any new or
useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and
useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefore, subject to the condi-
tions and requirements of this title."
ent application assigned to the General Electric Company. This
application asserted thirty-six claims related to Chakrabarty's in-
vention, genetically engineered bacteria capable of breaking down
multiple components of crude oil.3 Such properties are not pos-
sessed by any naturally existing bacteria.4
Chakrabarty filed three types of patent claims. The first type
included process claims relating to the method of producing the
bacteria.5 The second type included claims for an inoculum com-
prised of a carrier material, such as floating straw, combined with
the new bacteria. 6 The third type included claims for the bacteria
itself.7 The patent examiner allowed the first two claims involving
the process and the carrier material, but rejected the third claim
for patentability of the bacteria on the ground that there was no
coverage for the bacteria within section 101 of the patent law.8
The examiner reasoned that the claimed microorganisms were
"products of nature" and thus not patentable because living
things, generally, were not patentable subject matter.
The Patent Office Board of Appeals rejected the examiner's
3. This is accomplished by decomposing the oil into simpler substances
which can then serve as food for aquatic life.
4. Crude oil varies in the amount of hydrocarbons it contains. Chakrabarty
invented a bacterium from the genus Pseudomonas capable of breaking down four
different hydrocarbons by means of four different plasmids, i.e., hereditary units
physically separate from the chromosomes. 100 S. Ct. at 2205 n.1. At present, nat-
urally occurring bacteria are capable of breaking down different components of oil;
however, they do not degrade with equal speeds because only a portion of any
such mixed culture survives. By breaking down multiple components,
Chakrabarty's invention promises more rapid and efficient oil spill control. 100 S.
Ct. at 2204, 2206 n.2.
5. "A bacterium from the genus Pseudomonas containing therein at least two
stable energy-generating plasmids, each of said plasmids providing a separate hy-
drocarbon degradative pathway." In re Bergy, 596 F.2d 952, 970 (C.C.P.A. 1979).
6. "An inoculum for the degradation of a pre-selected substrate comprising a
complex or mixture of hydrocarbons, said inoculum consisting essentially of bac-
teria of the genus Pseudomonas at least some of which contain at least two stable
energy-generating plasmids, each of said plasmids providing a separate hydrocar-
bon degradative pathway." Id. at 970. The two groups of claims, above, were re-
jected by the Patent Office as not being "manufactures" or "compositions of
matter" within the meaning of § 101.
7. The third group consisted of claims 27 through 29 directed to a process or
improvement in a process of transferring plasmids from a donor to a recipient bac-
terium. The fourth group consisted of claims 30 through 32, 35 and 36, directed to
an inoculated medium. The only independent claim was claim 30, which read:
An inoculated medium for the degradation of liquid hydrocarbon sub-
strate material floating on water, said inoculated medium comprising a
carrier material able to float on water and bacteria from the genus
Pseudomonas carried thereby, at least some of said bacteria each contain-
ing at least two stable energy-generating plasmids, each of the said plas-
mids providing a separate hydrocarbon degradative pathway and said
carrier material being able to absorb said hydrocarbon material.
Id. at 970-71.
8. See note 2 supra.
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"product of nature" argument but sustained the decision that the
living microorganisms were not patentable under section 101 be-
cause Congress had enacted other laws, e.g., the Plant Patent Act
of 19309 and the Plant Act of 1970,10 which expressly provided pro-
tection only for living plants. Since live plants were not included
under section 101, but were included under other statutory provi-
sions, the Board reasoned that no living organism would qualify
as subject matter under section 101. The Board, therefore, based
its denial of the patent on what it perceived as congressional in-
tent to exclusively protect living things under the Plant Acts and
not under the patent laws."
III. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A similar case to Chakrabarty, In re Bergy12 (Bergy I), decided
earlier by the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals on October 6,
1977, reversed a Board decision against the granting of patent pro-
tection for living organisms. The same appellate court on March
2, 1978, also reversed the Board decision13 against granting patent
protection for living organisms in In re Chakrabarty.14 The appel-
late court based its decision solely on its earlier holding in Bergy
I.15 A petition for writ of certiorari for the Bergy I case was
9. 35 U.S.C. § 161 (1976) states:
Whoever invents or discovers and asexually reproduces any distinct
and new variety of plant, including cultivated spores, mutants, hybrids,
and newly found seedlings, other than a tuberprogated plant or a plant
found in an uncultivated state, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the
conditions and requirements of this title.
10. 7 U.S.C. § 2402 (1976) states in relevant part: "The breeder of any novel va-
riety of sexually reproduced plant (other than fungi, bacteria, or first generation
hybrids) who has so reproduced the variety, or his successor in interest, shall be
entitled to plant variety protection therefor ....
11. In re Bergy, 596 F.2d 952, 971 (C.C.P.A. 1979) [Bergy II]. Consequently, the
Board had extreme difficulty in approving the claim because the subject matter
was alive. The Board reasoned that if Chakrabarty's organisms were covered by
§ 101, then all living things, including human beings, would be patentable. Id. at
971.
12. 563 F.2d 1031 (C.C.P.A. 1977) [Bergy I ]. The court found a living organism
to be patentable subject matter under § 101. The microbiological process in Bergy
I was a "Streptomyces vellosus", which was specified in ten pages of text, includ-
ing descriptions of its production. This culture could produce an antibiotic called
Lincomycin in a recoverable quantity through a fermentation process. Id.
13. The Board held that Chakrabarty's claims were invalid and not statutory
subject matter under § 101.
14. 571 F.2d 40 (C.C.P.A. 1978). This was the appellate court opinion for Dia-
mond v. Chakrabarty, 100 S. Ct. 2204, which is the subject of this case comment.
15. Bergy I was first decided by the appellate court in October, 1977. That
granted by the Supreme Court. However, the case was later re-
manded to the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals to be reex-
amined in light of the Supreme Court's decision of Parker v.
Flook,16 which had been decided four days earlier. The Commis-
sioner of Patents and Trademarks then petitioned the appellate
court to vacate its Chakrabarty decision, in light of Parker v.
Flook and the Supreme Court's remand of Bergy I.
Perceiving a single issue17 in both cases, the Court of Custom
and Patent Appeals consolidated the Bergy I and Chakrabarty
decisions, "wiped the slate clean" on both cases,18 and reaffirmed
the two earlier decisions by stating that Flook had no bearing on
either case. 19 Certiorari was, again, granted in both cases. 20 How-
ever, the Supreme Court only reviewed Chakrabarty as the Bergy
case had become moot.2 1 The Supreme Court affirmed the appel-
late court's Chakrabarty decision, and accordingly, patents for
Chakrabarty's bacteria and process were granted.2 2
IV. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
An understanding of the Chakrabarty decision demands famili-
arity with the statutory provisions and case law upon which the
decision was based. Accordingly, an analysis of the relevant pat-
ent statutes and accompanying cases is presented.
A. Patent Statutes
Federal patent law has its roots in a specific constitutional pro-
vision which authorizes the Congress to "promote the Progress of
same court was presented with the identical question in December, 1977, in In re
Chakrabarty, 571 F.2d 40, see note 14 supra, and held that the claim was valid on
the basis of the Bergy I decision.
On the second review of both cases, the appellate court was acutely aware of the
nature of Bergy's and Chakrabarty's claims; but, nonetheless, recognized that both
cases involved the single issue of whether living things qualified as patentable
subject matter under § 101. 596 F.2d at 956-57.
16. 437 U.S. 584 (1978). Flook invented a method for updating alarm limits dur-
ing catalytic conversion processes. His novel contribution to this field was a math-
ematical formula, which was held to be incapable of being patented under § 101.
17. The single issue was whether the subject matter of Bergy and
Chakrabarty was patentable subject matter under § 101.
18. 596 F.2d at 957.
19. Id. at 967.
20. Since the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals found Flook not to be con-
trolling in either Bergy or Chakrabarty, the Supreme Court was forced to decide
the same issue.
21. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 444 U.S. 1028 (1980). The Supreme Court gave no
explanation why the Bergy case was moot.
22. 100 S.Ct. at 2204.
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Science and useful Arts, 23 by securing for limited Times, to . ..
Inventors, the exclusive Right to their. .. Discoveries;.. . [and]
to make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carry-
ing into Execution the foregoing Powers." 24 Congress may pro-
vide, pursuant to this authority, the proper guidelines for
inventors. 25 The problem in this area has been congressional in-
terpretation of the framers' intent. It is necessary to examine this
interpretation problem from its inception; only then may one per-
ceive the confusion and inconsistency of the courts, and under-
stand the complexity of decisions in the patent law field.26
The Patent Clause is both a grant and a limitation of power.27
The patent right granted by Congress is the reward given to the
inventor in exchange for the public benefit derived after the pat-
ent expires. 28 The inventor's right is a creature of statute and is,
therefore, subject to certain conditions and limitations imposed
by the Congress. 29 In Graham v. John Deere,30 the Supreme
Court explained that congressional exercise of the patent power
must adhere to the restraints imposed by the stated constitu-
tional purpose of promotion of science and the useful arts. The
Graham Court indicated that it would check any overreaching by
Congress in this area.
Congress may not authorize the issuance of patents whose effects are to
remove existent knowledge from the public domain or to restrict free ac-
cess to materials already available. Innovation, advancement, and things
which add to the sum of useful knowledge are inherent requisites in a pat-
ent system which by constitutional command must, promote the Progress
of useful Arts.' This is a standard expressed in the Constitution and it
may not be ignored.
3 1
23. Included are those inventions or discoveries which give advantage to the
public from exertions of individuals. Grant v. Raymond, 31 U.S. 218 (1832).
24. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8.
25. 596 F.2d at 958.
26. Id.
27. 1 A.W. DELLER, DELLER'S WALKER ON PATENTS 90 (2d ed. 1964) [hereinafter
cited as A.W. DELLER]. This characterization typifies the process by which Con-
gress must select policies which are suited to effectuate the constitutional aim of
promoting of the useful arts and sciences. Beidler v. United States, 253 U.S. 447
(1920).
28. A.W. DELLER, supra note 27, at 92.
29. Id.
30. 383 U.S. 1 (1966). This case involved a question of patent infringement and
a question of whether a shock absorbing device for plows used for rocky soil was
patentable under § 103 of the patent act. See note 65 infra. The Court held that
the device did not meet the § 103 requirement. 383 U.S. at 37.
31. 383 U.S. at 6. See also Great A.&P. Tea Co. v. Supermarket Equip. Corp.,
340 U.S. 147 (1950), where Justice Douglas pointed out the constitutional restraint
The Court further stated that Congress could implement policies
that it believed were consistent with the framers' intent and con-
stitutional purpose. 32
The first Congress did not hesitate to use its patent power. Re-
quests for a patent law abounded and Congress quickly re-
sponded by adopting the 1790 Patent Act on recommendation
from George Washington.33 This original patent law stated that a
patent could be issued to any applicant who "hath . . .invented
or discovered any useful art,34 manufacture, 35 . . .or device, or
any improvement therein not before known or used 36 .. .[as long
as] the invention or discovery [was] sufficiently useful and im-
portant."37 However, under the subsequent 1793 Patent Act, a
patent would be issued for the invention of any "machine,38 man-
ufacture, 39 or composition of matter 4o [which was] new and use-
ful."4 1 The 1793 Act's double requirement of new and useful as
opposed to the 1790 Act's "either/or" test, presented what is pres-
ently referred to as the "novelty and ultility test."'42
For several years following the 1793 statute, there were two
problems in patent law. The first was that American patent law
on Congress. "The Congress does not have free reign, for example, to decide that
patents should be easily or freely given." Id. at 154.
32. 383 U.S. at 6.
33. A.W. DELLER, supra note 27, at 93.
34. See note 23 supra and accompanying text.
35. "Manufacture" is one of the subjects or classes of inventions which may be
patented by the inventor. Manufactures may be new in the commercial sense, but
to meet this requirement in patent law, the new article must involve an invention
or discovery beyond what is necessary to construct the apparatus for its manufac-
ture or production. A.W. DELLER, supra note 27, at 123-24.
36. The "non-obviousness" test requires that a patent not be granted for an in-
novation unless it would not likely have developed absent the prospect of a patent.
The test is whether the achievement of the invention requires a greater degree of
skill than the level of ordinary skill in the art. See Kitch, Graham v. John Deere
Co.. New Standards for Patents, 1966 Sup. CT. REV. 293, 301.
37. 383 U.S. at 7. But see A.W. DELLER, supra note 27, at 94, for an examination
of Jefferson's philosophy behind issuing patents.
38. The test for patentability of a machine under the patent laws is threefold:
(1) what is the novel structure or device of the patentee; (2) what type of opera-
tion is employed by this novel structure or device; and (3) what new result was
attained by means of this mode of operation. A.W. DELLER, supra note 27, at 122.
39. See note 35 supra.
40. The phrase "composition of matter" covers all compositions of two or more
substances. It includes all composite products whether they are the result of
chemical union, mechanical functions, or whether they be gases, fluids, powders,
or solids. A.W. DELLER, supra note 27, at 127.
41. 1 Stat. 318-319 (1793). New and useful improvements are those which in-
corporate some addition or change in an existing machine, manufacture, or compo-
sition of matter. It may be an addition, simplification, or variance. See A.W.
DELLER, supra note 27, at 131.
42. Kitch, supra note 36, at 303. It was at this point in patent law that claims
were also required by the courts to be both new and useful to be patentable.
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attempted to define the concept of novelty. The purpose in defin-
ing the concept of novelty was to design rules that would prevent
any inconsequential advancements from receiving patent protec-
tion.43 The second problem was whether an invention was a
"change in form" or "change in substance."" A mere change in
the form of a prior invention was not held to be novel, hence, it
was not patentable, while a change in substance was held to be
novel and hence, was patentable. The courts had problems inter-
preting the statute, given the state of technology at that stage in
American history, and given the fact that the novelty requirement
was construed to by synonymous with the term "new". 45
The 1836 Patent Act imposed further criteria for patentability.
After 1836, any person who "'discovered or invented'. . was eli-
gible for a patent. '46 Thus, the necessity of invention was intro-
duced into the patent law. 47 The 1836 Act presently serves as the
basis for our modern patent system. 4 8
In 1850, the Supreme Court formed a general test for patentabil-
ity in Hotchkiss v. Greenwood.49 In Hotchkiss, the Court con-
strued the invention requirement, which was previously thought
to be a patent-limiting device, as a liberalization of the "new and
useful" standard.50 The Hotchkiss "non-obvious test" 51 distin-
43. 383 U.S. at 11. In Thompson v. Haight, 23 F. Cas. 1040-41 (C.C.S.D.N.Y.
1826) (No. 13,957), the court explained the difficulties of interpreting a statute with
the term "new." This term called for much ingenuity and competition. There were
so many innovators attempting to patent similar products that the courts found
the need to raise the standard for patentability to prevent every common product
from becoming the subject of a patent monopoly.
44. Kitch, supra note 36, at 303.
45. The 1793 Act only required that the patentee "invent" something. Mod-
ernly, mere "invention" will not entitle one to a patent. 383 U.S. at 116.
46. Act of July 4, 1836, ch. 357, 5 Stat. 117 (1836). Kitch, supra note 36, at 320.
47. Id. Hotchkiss v. Greenwood, 52 U.S. (11 How.) 248 (1850), stood for the
proposition that nothing short of an invention would support a patent. Thus, in-
vention became a third requirement for patentability. See note 49 infra and ac-
companying text.
48. A.W. DELLER, supra note 27, at 96. Section 101 of the present Patent Act is
very similar to the 1836 Act. All the requirements of "new," "useful," and "inven-
tion" are also part of § 101.
49. 52 U.S. (11 How.) 248 (1850). The patent involved a substitution of materi-
als. Porcelain or clay was being substituted for wood or metal in doorknobs. The
Supreme Court noted that the only "new" quality about this substitute was that it
cost less to make. This was, of course, not sufficient for the granting of the patent.
50. Kitch, supra note 36, at 312.
51. See note 36 supra. Non-obviousness is the modern term which has re-
placed the word "invention." For further insight, see In re Bergy, 533 F.2d 1031,
1034-39 (C.C.P.A. 1977).
guished between new and useful inventions that were capable of
sustaining a patent and those inventions which were not.5 2
Unless more ingenuity and skill were . . . required . .. than were pos-
sessed by an ordinary mechanic acquainted with the business, there was
an absence of that degree of skill and ingenuity which constitute essential
elements of every invention. In other words, the improvement is the work
of the skillful mechanic, not that of the inventor.
5 3
This language gave birth to the term "invention" as a word of le-
gal art signifying a patentable item. 54
Justice Nelson, in Hotchkiss admitted that a patent might be is-
suable even without novelty if there was the essential degree of
skill required for an invention.55 The rule of Hotchkiss was that a
change of materials would not itself be patentable, even if it re-
sulted in an improvement, unless the application of the materials
to the use required more than mechanical skill.56 Thus, the
Hotchkiss rule has been interpreted to mean that the end effect
or result must be new; however, if an invention has been previ-
ously used but later attains a different result or purpose, then
there may be patent protection. The Hotchkiss "non-obvious" test
laid the cornerstone of judicial evolution in patent law by making
the term "invention" a legal word of art in reviewing patentable
inventions. 57 The test can be characterized as a functional ap-
proach to questions of patentability where a comparison between
the function of the item sought to be patented and the skill in-
volved in its production is mandatory.58
In 1870, Congress brought all the patent statutes into one act.
In 1874, Congress consolidated most of the conditions for patenta-
bility into a single act.59 This Act remained the basic law of pat-
ents for eight decades until 1952. In that year, Congress divided
the 1874 statute into its logical components of novelty and utility
and added the "non-obvious" test, which the courts had previ-
ously been using to apply the invention requirement. The 1952
52. 383 U.S. at 11.
53. Hotchkiss v. Greenwood, 52 U.S. (11 How.) at 267.
54. 383 U.S. at 11. It appeared that the Hotchkiss decision finally enabled the
courts to make subtle distinctions upon which a patent would be granted or de-
nied. By imposing the "invention" requirement, the number of frivolous cases was
reduced.
55. This means that more ingenuity and skill in applying an old method to a
new product would be required than that possessed by someone skilled in that
field.
56. Kitch, supra note 36, at 313.
57. See 383 U.S. at 11. Making "invention" a term of art and leaving it to the
scrutiny of the courts was the suggestion of Thomas Jefferson. Id.
58. Id. at 12. Hotchkiss required a comparison between patent application and
the background skill of the calling. This comparison is the basis from which each
case would be determined.
59. 596 F.2d at 959.
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Patent Act set out, in three sections, the conditions for patentabil-
ity.60 Section 10161 enumerated the subject matter of the Patent
Act. Section 10262 set forth the general conditions for patentabil-
ity. Section 10363 expressed further conditions for patentability.
If any of the enumerated conditions for patentabilitly were not
satisfied, patent protection would be denied.64
Regardless of congressional attempts to further enumerate pat-
ent protection under the 1952 Act, the courts were still faced with
a number of problems. The first problem was interpreting the
words "invention" or "discovery." The second problem was the
difficulty in defining the identifiable subject matter covered by
section 101.65 Such subject matter included machines, 66
60. A.W. DELLER, supra note 27, at 97-100.
61. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1976). This section and § 102 were clarifications of the ear-
lier statutes. See 383 U.S. at 12-14 for a brief discussion on the impact of §§ 101,
102, and 103.
62. 35 U.S.C. § 102 (1976) states:
A person shall be entitled to a patent unless-
a) the invention was known or used by others in this country, or patented
or described in a printed publication in this or a foreign country, before
the invention thereof by the applicant for patent, or
b) the invention was patented or described in a printed publication in this
or a foreign country or in public use or on sale in this country, more than
one year prior to the date of the application for patent in the United
States, or
c) he has abandoned the invention, or
d) the invention was first patented or caused to be patented by the appli-
cant or his legal representatives or assigns in a foreign country prior to
the date of the application for patent in this country on an application
filed more than twelve months before the filing of the application in the
United States, or
e) the invention was described in a patent granted on an application for
patent by another filed in the United States before the invention thereof
by the applicant for patent, or
f) he did not himself invent the subject matter sought to be patented, or
g) before the applicant's invention thereof the invention was made in this
country by another who had not abandoned, suppressed, or concealed it
63. 35 U.S.C. § 103 (1976) states:
A patent may not be obtained though the invention is not identically dis-
closed or described as set forth in section 102 of this title, if the differences
between the subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art are
such that the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the
time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to
which said subject matter pertains. Patentability shall not be negatived
by the manner in which the invention was made.
64. Bird Provision Co. v. Owens Country Sausage, Inc., 568 F.2d 369, 372 (5th
Cir. 1978). This case involved an alleged infringement of a method of processing
and packing pork sausage. The method was found unpatentable because it failed
to meet the non-obviousness requirement of § 103.
65. 596 F.2d at 958-59. The Bergy II court was cognizant of the interpretive
processes, 67 manufactures, 68 and composition of matter;69 living
plants were covered by separate statutory provisions.70 Finally,
the third problem was the needed resolution of the conflict be-
tween the broad intent of the constitutional promotion of the arts
and sciences and the restrictive intent of the Patent Act.
In Bergy II, the court provided a clever analogy for the opera-
tion of sections 101, 102, and 103 in order to successfully obtain a
patent.7 1 The analogy stated that success of a patent claim is
predicated on the acquisition of three separate "keys" to open the
three successive "doors" of sections 101, 102, and 103. The court
stated that "the first door which must be opened on the difficult
path to patentability is § 101."72 The person opening it must be an
inventor who has invented or discovered something. The object
invented or discovered is defined in general language by section
101. If an invention falls within the "key" categories of section
101, the first "door" will be opened. The next "door" is section 102,
where claims are examined for novelty 73 in comparison with the
prior art. The final "door" of section 103 requires that the new ob-
ject be sufficiently different from the prior art or predecessor ob-
jects before a patent may be awarded. The "key" of section 103
relates the new object with the "prior art;" if the object, invented
or discovered, would have been, at the time of its invention or dis-
covery, obvious to a person skilled in the particular art, then it
may not be patented. 74 In this respect, the two "doors" of sec-
tions 102 and 103 guard the public interest by not taking away that
problems surrounding the terms "invention," "inventive," and "invent". The court
was quick to caution that the meanings of these terms prior to passage of the 1952
Patent Act were vastly different from their meanings after passage of the Act.
"Statements in the older cases must be handled with care lest the terms used in
their reasoning clash with the reformed technology of the present statute; lack of
meticulous care may lead to distorted legal conclusions." Id. at 959.
66. See General Tire and Rubber Co. v. Fisk Rubber Corp., 104 F.2d 740 (6th
Cir. 1939), which discusses the four classes of machines as inventions. These
classes are 1) embracement of the entire machine; 2) embracement of one or more
elements of the machine; 3) embracement of both a new element and a new com-
bination of elements; and 4) where all elements of the machine are old and where
the invention involves a new combination of these elements. Id.
67. A process is a mode of treatment of certain materials to a given result.
Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 786 (1877).
68. For usage of the term "manufacture" in the context of § 101, see Riter-Con-
ley Mfg. Co. v. Aiken, 203 F. 699 (3d Cir. 1913), cert. denied, 229 U.S. 617 (1913). A
new article of manufacture which does not differ from the prior art is not patenta-
ble. See Risdon Iron and Locomotive Works v. Medart, 158 U.S. 68 (1895).
69. For application of "composition of matter" based on a new use, see In re
Craige, 188 F.2d 505 (C.C.P.A. 1951).
70. See notes 9 and 10 supra. See A.W. DELLER, supra note 27, at 100.
71. A.W. DELLER, supra note 27, at 960.
72. Id.
73. See note 62 supra.
74. 596 F.2d at 962.
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which already is in the public domain, or potentially limiting
knowledge the public has already acquired. Thus, as concerning
the problem with the term "invention," the essential point to be
made is that an invention remains an invention regardless of pat-
entability. The real issue the courts should address is whether an
invention is patentable and thus, deserving of protection under
the patent law. 75
The term "discovery," in the context of the patent law, does not
have the broadest significance. 76 The Act defines "invention" as
"invention or discovery."7 7 Discovery is seen as an effect derived
from the production of something that did not exist before, thus,
satisfying the "new and useful" requirements.7 8 This definition of
discovery, as applied to natural phenomenon and the laws of na-
ture, illustrates the dilemma facing the courts as "[dI iscovery can
be made of a law of nature .... but it can never be invented." 79
The Supreme Court, in O'Reilly v. Morse,80 explained further that
the "mere discovery of a new element, or law, or principle of na-
ture, without any valuable application of it to the arts, is not the
subject of a patent."8 1 The Morse Court noted that one who ap-
plies such a discovery to the perfecting of a jrew and useful art,8 2
or in improving an art already known,83 "is the benefactor to
whom the patent law tenders its protection." 84 It is provided,
however, that this principle must be applied to any special pur-
pose to effectuate a practical result and benefit not previously at-
tained.85 This distinction, between discovery of a natural law and
discovery and utilization of a natural law, has been an unavoida-
75. Id.
76. In its primary and ordinary sense, discovery is not synonymous with in-
vent and invention. Webster distinguished the word "discover" from "invent."
"Invention is applied to the contrivance and production of something that did not
exist before. Discovery brings* to light that which existed before, but which was
not known." A.W. DELLER, supra note 27, at 101.
77. See 35 U.S.C. § 100(a) (1976).
78. A.W. DELLER, supra note 27, at 101.
79. Id. at 103.
80. 56 U.S. (15 How.) 62 (1853). This case involved the question of patentabil-
ity of Samuel Morse's invention of the electromagnetic telegraph.
81. Id. at 132.
82. This would include inventions relating to patentable subjects, processes,
manufactures, machines or compositions of matter.
83. An example of a discovery to the perfection of a new and useful art was
the process of separating fats and oils. See note 99 infra.
84. 56 U.S. (15 How.) at 133.
85. Id.
ble dilemma with which the courts have had to reckon throughout
the history of patent law.86
B. Case Law History
The courts had taken progressive steps in attempting to protect
patents involving the concept or phenomenon of nature. An anal-
ysis of case law evidences the courts' realization that a broader
interpretation of the patent statutes, rather than mere deliniation
of their terms, was necessary to meet this protective goal.
1. Early Judicial Decisions
One of the first Supreme Court opinions to consider the concept
or phenomena of nature and patentability was LeRoy v.
'Tathum.87 The Tathum Court stated that a principle or law of na-
ture, i.e., a fundamental truth, motive, or original cause8 8 could
not be patented. When an inventor succeeds in concentrating or
harnessing a natural agency,89 the process used is the invention,
the application of the process, and not the discovery itself is pat-
entable.90 The Tathum Court stated that a patent will be forth-
coming even though the subject matter involves a comprehensive
principle in science or law of nature;91 however, the principle
must be applied to a special purpose and so as to give rise to a
practical result and a benefit not previously attained.92 Although
the Tathum Court recognized that the plaintiff had a newly dis-
covered, but naturally occurring phenomenon, a patent was de-
nied, despite there being no direct or indirect monopolization of
the phenomenon, because the apparatus was wholly predicated
on a natural phenomenon. 93
Following the Tathum decision, the Supreme Court decided
86. Although a discovery may add to human knowledge and be of a great ben-
efit to mankind, it is still possible that it may not be patentable. The tourts have
had the task of attempting to delineate invention utilizing laws of nature and natu-
ral phenomena along this line of reasoning. See The Telephone Cases, 126 U.S. 1
(1888) (involving the valid patenting of Alexander Graham Bell's telephone); Wall
v. Leck, 66 F. 552, 555 (9th Cir. 1895) (where an old process for fumigating plants
and trees by hydrocyanic acid gas at night or without sunlight was an insufficient
discovery for a patent).
87. 55 U.S. (14 How.) 156 (1852). The invention reviewed here concerned the
manufacture of lead pipes by a new process of mixing the alloys together.
88. Id. at 175. The Court was addressing what a principle encompassed. The
fact that a motive or an original cause of a principle is discovered or proven by an
inventor cannot give him exclusive rights over them.
89. See note 90 infra.
90, 55 U.S. (14 How.) at 175. See also In re Bergy, 596 F.2d at 990, for a recent
interpretation of the LeRoy case.
91. See id. at 175.
92. Id.
93. 596 F.2d at 991. The court believed that LeRoy's manufacture of lead was
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O'Reilly v. Morse 4 It was in Morse that the Court first carved
out an exception to the general rule of nonpatentability for any
claim connected with laws of nature or natural phenomena. In a
lengthy opinion, the Morse Court clearly explained the relation-
ship between the laws of nature, their use for a process or claim,
and patent protection.
He who first discovers that an element or law of nature can be made oper-
ative for the production of some valuable result, some new art, or the im-
provement of some known art, who has devised the machinery or process
to make it operative, and introduced it in a practical form to the
knowledge of mankind, is a discoverer and inventor of the highest class
.... The mere discovery of a new element, or law, or principle of nature,
without any valuable application of it to the arts, is not the subject of a
patent. But he who takes this new element or power, as yet useless, from
the laboratory of the philosopher, and makes it the servant of man, who
applies it to the perfecting of new and useful art, or to the improvement of
one already known, is the benefactor to whom the patent law tenders its
protection.
95
The Morse Court stated further that when an unknown product
or effect is influenced by a new application or element of 'nature,
one can not deny that a new and useful art results. 96 In interpret-
ing the congressional intent, the Court believed it made no differ-
ence whether the effect was produced by chemical agency,
chemical combination, or principles in nature, either known or
unknown. If the manner and process involved and the end ac-
complished 97 the use of a law of nature or natural phenomenon,
patent protection of the process or claim could be granted but not
solely for the law of nature or phenomenon involved.98
In Tilghman v. Proctor,99 the Court applied the principle of
Morse toward allowing patent protection of natural phenomena.
After reviewing the Morse decision,OO where the claim for a prin-
expressly limited to his apparatus alone and thus, there was no reason to allow a
patentable claim because of his usage of a natural phenomenon.
94. 56 U.S. (15 How.) 62 (1853).
95. Id. at 133. This statement evidences the requirement that the law of na-
ture or natural phenomenon must be used in a discovery before a valid patent will
result.
96. Id. at 132-33.
97. Id. at 119.
98. Id.
99. 102 U.S. 707 (1880). This was a patent infringement case involving a pro-
cess separating fats and oils into their component parts. Tilghman discovered a
process of mixing fats and oils with water under high pressure and temperature
which accomplished the desired separation.
100. Id. at 725-29.
ciple was held invalid, 10 1 the Tilghman Court stated that the
chemical fact upon which Tilghman's claim was founded was not
his discovery. The point, which made Tilghman an exceptional
case, was that Tilghman only claimed to invent a particular mode
of a desired process, but did not claim every mode of accomplish-
ing the result. Therefore, since his claim did not monopolize nat-
ural phenomena, the claim was found valid.' 02
With technological advancement came the need to expand pat-
ent protection. The courts soon realized that the usage of the
laws of nature and natural phenomenon could aid a claim or pro-
cess while not disqualifying this claim or process from patent pro-
tection. With this in mind, the Supreme Court began to expand
the Tilghman exception. 103 In Eibel Process Co. v. Minnesota &
Ontario Paper Co. ,104 the Court viewed an improved process us-
ing the natural phenomenon of gravity. In Eibel Process, the
Court decided there was a proper use of a natural phenomenon to
produce a new and useful end result. 0 5 The Court then took a
bold step forward in Dick v. Lederle Antitoxin Laboratories,106
where it found that a scarlet fever toxin and the processes for its
production and injection were both patentable. 10 7 In addressing
the issue of natural phenomena and discovery, the Dick Court be-
lieved it should take into account the fact that the processes in-
volved were beyond the experimental stage. However, there was
still a dispute whether an invention, as opposed to a discovery,
had taken place. The Court believed that although Dick's claim
involved a natural phenomenon, it nonetheless constituted an in-
101. The Tilghman Court used the rationale of Morse and LeRoy and reempha-
sized the invalidity of a patent for anything that was merely a discovery of a natu-
rally occuring phenomenon. Id. at 729.
102. Id. The Court further agreed with the Morse and LeRoy decisions by rec-
ognizing that Tilghman's claim used a natural phenomenon for a new and useful
end. This distinction, not merely doing that which nature does already, made
Tilghman's claim patentable.
103. See note 102 supra.
104. 261 U.S. 45 (1923). This case involved the patentability of an improvement
in papermaking machines by the elevation of one end of a moving screen. The ele-
vated liquid stock acquired, by the effects of gravity, additional speed which
avoided injurious disturbances of the stock during rapid paper movement.
105. Id. at 66-67. The Eibel Process Court found that increased elevation was
not a matter of mere degree but it amounted to an invention when applied suc-
cessfully to remedy an old defect (injurious disturbances of the stock during rapid
paper movement) in connection with the discovery of the cause of this defect,
which was the low elevation of the liquid stock. Id. at 68-69.
106. 43 F.2d 628 (S.D.N.Y. 1930). Dick's application for a patent for the process
of making a scarlet fever toxin and antitoxin, as well as for a patent on these two
items themselves, was approved by the court.
107. It should be noted that this was the first time this toxin was produced in a
laboratory. The court found that both Dick's process and product constituted in-
ventions although he used a natural phenomenon which did not naturally exist in
such a form.
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vention and the enforcement of his patent claim was valid. 0 8
The patentable use of laws of nature and natural phenomena
was also found in MacKay Radio & Telegraph Co. v. Radio Corp.
of America.0 9 This case involved the phenomenon of standing
waves that produced a new and useful result by means of a math-
ematical formula. The Court held that while a scientific truth, or
the mathematical expression of it is not a patentable invention, a
novel and useful structure created with the aid of knowledge of
scientific truth may be patentable.110 Accordingly, the Court
found the claim valid."'
2. The Bacteria Cases
The novel question concerning the patentability of a process us-
ing bacteria arose in Guaranty Trust Co. of New York v. Union
Solvents Corp.,li2 where a Dr. Weizmann discovered a particular
species of new bacteria and invented a process for successfully
using them."l 3 The district court held that the process was pat-
entable if it was sufficient to enable others to make use of the bac-
teria.
In dicta, the Guaranty Trust court touched on what later be-
came a very sensitive and confusing area of patent law, namely,
whether life processes of living organisms and their creation were
patentable subject matter. In addressing the patentability of a
life process of a living organism, the court was hesitant: "[w] ere
the patent for bacteria per se, a different situation would be
presented. As before stated, the patent is not for bacteria per se.
It is for a fermentation process employing bacteria ... [and] un-
doubtedly there is patentable subject-matter in the invention.""14
108. 43 F.2d at 631.
109. 306 U.S. 86 (1939).
110. Id. at 94.
111. The phenomenon involved an antenna system which utilized principles of
electromagnetic and standing waves. The court held the patent valid because a
novel and useful structure created with the aid of nature may be patentable. Id.
112. 54 F. Supp. 400 (D. Del. 1931).
113. The court held that Dr. Weizmann's claim was sufficiently stated so that
others could produce it, and therefore, it could not be infringed. The court re-
jected the defendant's arguments that the patent processes were vague.
114. 54 F. Supp. at 410. See also City of Milwaukee v. Activated Sludge Inc., 69
F.2d 577 (7th Cir. 1934) (an infringement of a valid patent on a process of purifica-
tion of sewage); Cameron Septic Tank Co. v. Village of Saratoa Springs, 159 F. 453
(2d Cir. 1908) (an infringement of a patented apparatus for sewage treatment).
In Bergy I, the court thought this statement was "a trite observation of minimal
magnitude as precedent." 563 F.2d at 1031. The court did find it pertinent that the
In Dennis v. Pitner,115 the seventh circuit agreed with the Guar-
anty Trust decision by stating that the discovery of a natural phe-
nomenon may be entitled to patent protection. The Dennis court
agreed that there are laws of nature which are not patentable,116
but held that phrases such as "laws of nature" and "fundamental
truth" are words "of broad and elastic meaning . . . without .. .
refined distinctions."1 1 7
The Supreme Court seemed to narrow the term "laws of na-
ture" in Funk Bros. Seed. Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co. ,118 where it
held a patent claim for a strain of bacteria invalid because it
sought protection for qualities that were solely the work of na-
ture,119 "free to all men and reserved exclusively to none.' 20 The
Court held that the strain was acting in its natural way and had
always served nature's end in that fashion.121
Another problem arose concerning products of nature. In re-
sponse, the courts have held that where a product can be pro-
duced from a man-made source, but is also found as a product of
nature, a patent claim is valid. 122 Although the patented product
is not a newly created compound per se, but rather a purified
form of a product of nature, the law is satisfied and and a patent
Guaranty Trust court rejected the defendant's argument that the patent was inva-
lid because it involved a living organism. Id. at 1036.
115. 106 F.2d 142 (7th Cir. 1939). This case concerned an infringement action in-
volving a powerful insecticide, in extract or powdered form, derived from the root
of a South American cube plant.
116. The Dennis court held that any natural phenomenon which is free to the
public and not the discovery of anyone is such a law of nature. Id.
117. 106 F.2d at 145. Unlike the Funk court, the Dennis court believed that the
patent statutes did not put limitations on discoveries applying laws of nature for a
new and useful result.
118. 333 U.S. 127 (1948). This case involved the infringement of a patented
method of isolating certain strains of seed inoculants. The patent holder provided
a mixed culture capable of inoculating plant seeds of different cross-inoculation
groups. This method had previously been presumed to be a non-natural occur-
rence.
119. Id. The bacteria were also created in the same manner without the aid of
man.
120. 333 U.S. at 130.
121. If the seeds in Funk had created a new and useful result, the patent may
have been held valid. Funk was attempting to patent a natural process and not to
use it for a new result; therefore, a patent was not proper. For an affirmation of
this doctrine of pheonomenon of nature, see Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63
(1972), which involved a data processing invention for the programmed conversion
of numerical information in general purpose digital computers.
122. Merck & Co. v. Chase Chem. Co., 273 F. Supp. 68 (D.N.J. 1967) (an infringe-
ment suit where a new vitamin, B-12, which was not formed in nature, was pro-
duced and had marked effects in the treatment of anemia). But see General Elec.
Co. v. DeForest Radio Co., 28 F.2d 641 (3d Cir. 1928) (an inventor's method of pro-
ducing tungsten for use as filaments for incandescent lamps was found so similar
to a process and chemical element found in nature that a patent was denied).




In viewing some of the modern holdings concerning microorga-
nisms as products of nature, the court of appeals, in In re
Mancy,124 held a process for producing a known antibiotic using a
new strain of microorganism to be unpatentable. 125 The Mancy
court, in its determination that Mancy's claim was invalid because
it lacked novelty, unnecessarily inserted dicta, based on the case
of In re Kuehl,12 6 which stated that there would be a presumption
against patentability of living organisms and that Mancy would
also be unable to obtain a patent, because as the court under-
stood it, his claim was for a living product of nature.127 The court
of appeals in Bergy I explained that the Mancy dicta had been re-
lied on by the patent examiner as supporting the proposition that
living organisms were not statutory subject matter under section
101. The Bergy I court explained that this was an ill-considered
piece of dictum. "We were thinking of something plucked from
the earth as such, a far cry from a biologically pure culture pro-
duced by great labor in the laboratory."128 This was reiterated by
the Bergy II court.129
While focusing on microorganisms as statutory subject matter,
the Bergy I court gave a brief historical analysis of judicial review
in this area and concluded:
It seems illogical to us to insist that the existence of life in a manufacture
or composition of matter in the form of a biologically pure culture of a mi-
croorganism removes it from the category of subject matter which can be
123. 273 F. Supp. at 82-83. In Merck, the new vitamin had completely eliminated
the harmful side effects of the old liver oil product. Thus, the court found this a
significant distinction to warrant patent protection. Id. at 83.
124. 499 F.2d 1289 (C.C.P.A. 1974). In this case the patentee claimed a process
for producing an antibiotic found and isolated from a soil sample. However, the
court determined that the antibiotic sufficiently met the non-obvious test of § 103
without directly determining the patent validity. Id.
125. Id.
126. 475 F.2d 658 (C.C.P.A. 1973) (discussion of the non-obviousness require-
ment of § 103 in the context of a process or use of a novel material).
127. 499 F.2d at 1294.
128. 596 F.2d at 976. The Bergy II court appeared to dismiss any inference that
could be drawn from the dicta of the Guaranty Trust or Mancy cases. See notes
114 and 124 supra and accompanying text. The Bergy II court also used its greater
familiarity with the subject matter at issue by stating that "had we known [in
Bergy I] what we know now, we would likely have abjured the stated presump-
tion [of Mancy ]." 596 F.2d at 976.
129. 596 F.2d at 976.
patented while the functioning of a living organism and the utilization of
its life functions in processes does not affect their status under § 101 ....
[IIt is clear. . . there is nothing in the words of § 101 which excludes pat-
ents for living organisms. 13
0
The Bergy I court also stated that processes had long been held
patentable and uniformly considered to be statutory subject mat-
ter, regardless of the fact that such processes involved use of liv-
ing organisms and their life processes.'31 In attacking the
rationale of Funk, the Bergy I court rejected the view that any
process created which simulates a naturally occurring event is
not patentable. The Bergy I court urged that if the Funk view
was accepted, it would be extremely difficult to grant a patent on
any chemical process. Further, the Funk proposition would be
the mistaken acceptance of a deceiving similarity between a
chemical reaction and the complex chemical procedure resulting
in life processes of organisms.132 Finally, the Bergy I court stated
that it believed the public interest dictated that microorganisms
should be included within the terms "manufacture and composi-
tion of matter" in section 101 and their status as living organisms
was without legal significance.133 If the microorganisms met the
requirements of patentability, i.e., novelty, utility, and non-obvi-
ousness, the Bergy I court believed that the characteristic of be-
ing a living thing did not take the organism outside the realm of
statutory subject matter.134
It appeared that up to this point, that the courts had been con-
sistently drawing to the logical conclusion that products of nature
were patentable under section 101. However, in Parker v.
Flook,135 the Supreme Court took a step backward by restoring
the validity of the Funk case. The Court stated that even though
a phenomenon of nature may be well known, an inventive appli-
cation of such a phenomenon would not fall under the statutory
subject matter in secton 101 unless the discovery was clearly an
invention.136 The Court stated that it should be cautious about
130. 563 F.2d at 1037.
131. Id. at 1035-36.
132. The Bergy II court apparently noted the difference that the chemical pro-
cess itself is not a direct assimilation of a naturally occurring phenomenon. As in
Chakrabarty, the invention was man-made and not capable of ever occurring nat-
urally. This is a vital distinction which was overlooked by the Funk court.
133. 563 F.2d at 1038. It appeared that the Bergy I court was attempting to pave
the way for Supreme Court affirmation of the patent award. By stating that "living
things" were not a significant problem in granting patent protection, the Bergy I
court removed the Board's sole ground for rejection and in the process cleared up
the past inconsistencies in prior cases.
134. Id.
135. See note 16 supra.
136. See note 36 supra.
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going into an area wholly unforeseen by Congress.137 In citing
Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp.,138 the Flook Court be-
lieved it should have a clear signal from Congress before chang-
ing well established law.139 Therefore, in light of the Flook
decision, it appeared the Supreme Court had totally retracted the
"laws of nature" expansion of patentable subject matter. It was
on the premise that Flook was controlling law that the Supreme
Court remanded the Bergy case to the Court of Customs and Pat-
ent Appeals for reconsideration.140
The Bergy II court, reconsidering Bergy's and Chakrabarty's
claims in light of Flook, again had to decide whether their
claimed organisms were statutorily protected subject matter
under section 101. In the Bergy II court's discussion of the patent
statutes, it pointed out that the Flook Court erroneously commin-
gled distinct statutory subject matter under section 101 with con-
ditions for patentability under section 103 because these concepts
were conceptually unrelated. 14' The Bergy II court also, noted
that section 103 enumerated, for the first time in statutory form, a
judicial requirement for the past 100 years;142 namely, that the
"non-obvious" test had replaced the "invention" requirement.
Finally, the Bergy IH court addressed the issue the Flook Court
thought was so important i.e., that a clear signal 'from Congress
was needed before patents could be granted for living things. The
court quickly brushed this argument aside by stating that the
claims of Bergy and Chakrabarty were of first impression, and
since no change in the law had taken place,143 no signal from Con-
gress was needed.
The appellate court distinguished the Flook decision, in that
Flook involved a computer process amenable to patent protec-
137. 437 U.S. at 596.
138. 406 U.S. 518 (1972). This case involved judicial interpretation of the
breadth of language in a statute.
139. Id. at 531. The Deepsouth case stood for the proposition where there is a
basis for substantial doubt as to congressional intent, the court should await a
clear and certain signal from Congress.
140. 596 F.2d at 956. It is interesting to note the confusion surrounding the
Flook decision. When the Supreme Court remanded Bergy to the lower court it
was implied that Flook was controlling law on both the Bergy and Chakrabarty
cases. However, when Chakrabarty was brought before the Supreme Court, it ac-
cepted the lower court's rejection of Flook as controlling law.
141. Id. at 959.
142. 596 F.2d at 962.
143. Id. at 964.
tion, while "[n]o such issue [was] presented in either [Bergy or
Chakrabarty J.,"144 Hence, it appeared that the Bergy II court
distinguished Flook on its facts since a mathematical formula was
not at issue in either of the two claims before it.145
Further, the court commented that the Flook decision seemed
to place an unjustifiable barrier on cases involving laws of nature
and natural phenomenon. The Bergy II court believed that such a
barrier would do great harm to the incentives of the patent sys-
tem.'4
V. THE CHAKRABARTY DECISION
The Supreme Court's analysis of Chakrabarty was based on
two considerations. The first was the statutory interpretation of
section 101 and the second was the patentability of products of
nature. The Court's determination of these issues, as well as the
Government's contention that congressional intent never envi-
sioned that a living thing would be patentable, will be examined.
Since the decision was closely divided, an analysis of the dis-
sent's arguments against patentability of living things will also be
analyzed.
A. Statutory Interpretation
The Chakrabarty Court believed the question before it to be a
very narrow one, the statutory interpretation of section 101 of the
1952 Patent Act. More specifically, the Court had to determine
whether Chakrabarty's microorganism constituted a "manufac-
ture" or "composition of matter" within the meaning of the sec-
tion. 147 This characterization of the issue by the Court indicated
an almost immediate affirmation of the appellate court ruling in
Bergy II because novelty, use, or invention were not in issue.148
Chief Justice Burger, speaking for the majority, began the opin-
ion by defining the terms "manufacture" and "composition of mat-
ter." The Chief Justice showed that the use of "manufacture" as
employed by the courts had come to mean "the production of arti-
cles for use from raw materials prepared by giving to these mater-
144. 596 F.2d at 965.
145. The court stated that cases dealing with mathematical formulas are dealt
with differently and they should be decided in accord with Gottschalk v. Benson,
409 U.S. 63 (1972). 596 F.2d at 995.
146. 596 F.2d at 966. By discarding the barriers imposed by the Flook decision,
the court properly reversed the inflexible stance of prior case law and brought ju-
dicial interpretation of the patent acts more in line with constitutional intent.
147. 100 S. Ct. at 2207. See note 22 supra.
148. The court stated that § 101 did not involve either a process, use, or novelty.
596 F.2d at 962-63.
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ials new forms, quality, properties, or combinations, whether by
hand, labor, or machinery."149 Anything within that definition
was to be considered patentable. However, the term "manufac-
ture" is a wholly different concept from section 101's enumeration
of "processes, machines, and composition of matter."150 Further,
the Court's definition does not indicate that every manufacture
will be immediately eligible for patent protection. "Manufacture
implies a change, but every change is not manufacture, and yet
every change in an article is the result of treatment of labor, and
manipulation."' 5 ' When a claim is for an improved process or
manufacture, it is patentable. 152 The Court's definition of "manu-
facture" reflected the degree to which the term had been liberally
interpreted over the years. 5 3
The Court's definition of "composition of matter" was subject to
similar treatment. Common usage of the term included "all com-
posite articles whether they be the result of chemical union, or of
mechanical mixture, or whether they be gases, fluids, powders, or
solids."'154 Indeed, this class is very broad and embraces a great
variety of things.55 The term used in the patent statutes, covers
all compositions of two or more substances. However, a "compo-
sition of matter," as well as a "manufacturer," must meet all re-
quirements of novelty, utility, and non-obviousness before a
patent will be issued. 156
149. 100 S. Ct. at 2207, (citing American Fruit Growers Inc. v. Brodgex Co., 283
U.S. 1, 11 (1931)) (a case involving a claim for a new process, which used a chemi-
cal solution for preparing fresh fruit for market).) The Oxford Dictionary gives a
more concise definition of "manufacture": "an article or material produced by the
application of physical labour or mechanical power." IV OXFORD ENGUISH Dic-
TIONARY 143 (1933).
150. See A.W. DELLER, supra note 27, at 126 and notes 71, 72, 74 supra.
151. A.W. DELLER, supra note 27, at 125.
152. 158 U.S. at 79.
153. The term "manufacture" has been held to include building structures, roof
structures, a stadium, a paper pulp process and pellets of carbon black. See A.W.
DELLER, supra note 27, at 125, 126.
154. 100 S. Ct. at 2207, (citing Shell Dev. Co. v. Watson, 149 F. Supp. 279, 280
(D.D.C. 1957)) (involved an organic compound, generally denominated as a hydro-
carbon)).
155. An example of this class is a chemical compound made from super-satu-
rated solution derived by dissolving acetylene gas. Commercial Acetylene Co. v.
Avery Portable Lighting Co., 166 F. 907 (E.D. Wis. 1909) (a composition of matter
can be derived from the discovery of the qualities of a purely natural element).
See also Libbey-Owens-Ford Glass Co. v. Celanese Corp. of America, 135 F.2d 138
(6th Cir. 1943).
. 156. See notes 35-40 supra and accompanying text. Chakrabarty's claim only
needed to be classified as a "manufacture" or a "composition of matter." The pat-
The Court emphasized that Congress plainly contemplated that
the patent laws would be given wide scope because the terms
"manufacture" and "composition of matter" were preceded by the
comprehensive modifier "any" in the statute's wording.l5 7 The
Court stated that legislative history, as evidenced by the fact that
the 1793 Act embodied the philosophy that "ingenuity should re-
ceive a liberal encouragement,"158 supported a broad construction
of these terms. The Court also relied on a statement contained in
reports accompanying the 1952 Act, that "Congress intended stat-
utory subject matter to include everything under the sun by
man,"159 and that "[ilt is a fundamental principle of patent law
that a claim may not be narrowly construed to avoid invalid-
ity."160 Given this rationale and the legislative history, it appears
that the Supreme Court's liberal construction of statutory subject
matter under section 101 is valid.161
In Bergy II, the court refused to agree with the decision of the
Patent Board of Appeals that section 101 must be strictly con-
strued.
Indeed, in light of what the courts have done over the past seventy years
in holding [manufacture or composition of matter] claims valid . . . . we
have never heard of a case holding that the categories of patentable sub-
ject matter, as enumerated in Section 101 or any of its predecessor stat-
utes, should be strictly construed and the Board has cited none.
1 6 2
The Bergy II court also stated that there was considerable over-
lap between manufacture and composition of matter and that if a
claim fell into either of these broadly interpreted categories, then
it was within protected subject matter.
The Supreme Court, in regards to Chakrabarty's claim, ap-
ent for composition of matter is distinct from the patent for the process by which
the product is produced. Both must individually meet the novelty, utility, and
non-obviousness requirements. The Supreme Court was faced with the problem
of deciding whether a live organism could be classified as a "manufacture" or a
"composition of matter." However, the Court's answer was ambiguous in that its
decision in Chakrabarty did not state which classification typified Chakrabarty's
claim. 100 S. Ct. at 2207.
157. Id.
158. Id. See also 383 U.S. at 7-10.
159. 100 S. Ct. at 2207 (quoting the Committee Report accompanying the 1952
Act, S. REP. No. 1979, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1952); H.R. REP. No. 1923, 82d Cong., 2d
Sess., 6 (1952)).
160. Arshal v. United States, 621 F.2d 421, 428 (C.C.P.A. 1980). This case in-
volved the question whether a mathematical expression of an equation was pat-
entable subject matter.
161. The Court did not specify whether Chakrabarty's claim was a "manufac-
ture" or "composition of matter." See note 156 supra.
162. 563 F.2d at 1037. The analysis by the court appears to be valid. The courts
had been willing to expand the areas of patent protection in an attempt to keep up
with technological advancement. However, it could also be argued that the courts'
liberal construction has been within certain boundaries. In this context, the "laws
of nature" restriction can be viewed as one such boundary.
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proved the Bergy II court's analysis of statutory interpretation.
Chief Justice Burger recognized that section 101 had its limits and
that it did not embrace every discovery. He agreed with Judge
Baldwin's concurring opinion in Bergy II which noted that al-
though the wording of the patent acts was not as sweeping as the
wording in the constitutional grant of patent power, the protection
of the promotion of the arts and sciences demanded a broad inter-
pretation of the patent law. In viewing the House and Senate re-
ports on patents, Judge Baldwin stated that the Patent Act of 1952
evidenced an adherence to the liberal construction of terms. 163
The Chief Justice stated, however, that the laws of nature, physi-
cal phenomena, and abstract ideas have traditionally been held to
be not patentable. 164 The Chakrabarty majority concluded on
this point that although Chakrabarty's bacteria was not an un-
known phenomenon of nature, it was a non-naturally occurring
result,165 i.e., a product of human ingenuity. By contrasting
Chakrabarty's invention with the purported invention in Funk,166
the Court found Chakrabarty's claims within patentable subject
matter under section 101.167
B. Products of Nature and Natural Phenomena
After deciding that living things could be proper subject matter
under section 101, the Supreme Court then discussed whether
natural phenomena and laws of nature were a limitation on that
subject matter under section 101. The Court again affirmed the
lower court rulings by distinguishing a man-made product, relying
partially upon nature, from one merely taken wholly from na-
ture.168 The Court stated that there was no valid reason to deny
patentability simply because the discovery was made through the
combination of existing elements producing a new and unknown
result.169 In order to be a patentable invention, a discovery in-
163. 596 F.2d at 988. See note 159 supra
164. 100 S. Ct. at 2208. See Le Roy v. Tatham, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 156, 174 (1852).
See note 90 supra.
165. This result was one which would never occur in nature unless brought to-
gether under man-made conditions.
166. In Funk, the result sought to be patented could occur without the aid of
man. See notes 118 and 121 supra.
167. 100 S. Ct. at 2208.
168. Id.
169. Dennis v. Pitner, 106 F.2d 142, 144 (7th Cir. 1939). As has been previously
discussed, the courts have become increasingly permissive in granting a patent for
a discovery using a law of nature. If this was not the posture of the courts, many
volving a law of nature or a natural phenomenon must have the
requisite aid of a man-made process so as to arrive at a new and
useful result.170 In the present case, Chakrabarty combined ele-
ments of nature, which would never have been combined without
the help of man. By combining four different microorganisms to
make an entirely new bacteria capable of far more efficient and
rapid degradation of oil spills than organisms found in nature,
Chakrabarty used nature to achieve a new and useful result.171
The Court also determined that Funk was not controlling in
Chakrabarty's case. The Funk Court specifically stated that there
was no invention or discovery in that case because Funk had only
discovered a handiwork of nature. Unlike Chakrabarty's claim,
Funk's discovery in no way differed from an effect that already oc-
curred in nature, producing no new and useful result. Justice
Douglas, speaking for the Funk Court majority, explained that the
lack of a man-made process or use of nature for a new and useful
result was the reason for denying patentability.
The qualities of these bacteria, like the heat of the sun, electricity, or the
qualities of metals, are part of the storehouse of knowledge of all men.
They are manifestations of laws of nature, free to all men and reserved ex-
clusively to none. He who discovers a hitherto unknown phenomenon of
nature has no claim to a monopoly of it which the law recognizes. If there
is to be invention from such a discovery, it must come from the applica-
tion of the law of nature to a new and useful result. 17 2
Justice Douglas's rationale for denying Funk's claim conversely
would require Chakrabarty's claim to be patentable. Chakrabarty
produced a new bacteria which neither served an end that nature
already provided, nor was accomplished independent of any act of
Chakrabarty17 3
C. Government Argument
The Government attempted to reverse the lower court ruling by
products would be denied patents, and thus, inventors would not be encouraged to
"promote the arts and sciences." Even with this permissiveness, the requirements
under §§ 101, 102, and 103 must still be satisfied.
170. 621 F.2d at 427-28.
171. In Bergy II the court found that the claim was not found in nature but was
only possible through man-made laboratory conditiong. Courts have found that
when products of nature are extracted and concentrated in a purified form they
are patentable. 563 F.2d at 1034-35.
172. 333 U.S. at 130. The Funk Court appears to reestablish the statements of
the Morse Court. See note 95 supra.
173. Initially, it only appears that the two cases are distinguishable on the facts.
However, upon closer examination of the results of the decisions, the differing im-
pact in light of the purpose of the patent laws is revealed. Funk's claim did not aid
the progress of the respective areas of science and added no efficiency to the natu-
ral process. 333 U.S. at 131-32. Chakrabarty's claim, however, accomplished a new
and useful, as well as a more efficient result, and should be rewarded. 100 S. Ct. at
2206.
770
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arguing that Congress never intended a living organism to be pat-
entable subject matter and that the passage by Congress of two
separate acts for the patenting of plants precluded living orga-
nisms from falling under the purview of section 101.174
1. Congressional Intent Argument
The Government's first argument appears to have been one of
considerable importance to the decision of this case. The Govern-
ment contended that genetic technology was unforeseen by Con-
gress when enacting section 101 and that the legislative process
was best equipped to weigh the competing economic, social, and
scientific considerations involved in the determination whether
living organisms should receive patent protection. 7 5 The Court
agreed with the Government that Congress must define the limits
of patentability, but the Court held that once Congress had spo-
ken, it was the province of the judicial department to interpret
and apply the law. Since Congress had defined what patentable
subject matter was, the Court reasoned that it was left to the
Court to construe the language Congress had employed.
The Court stated, in reference to the Government's contention
that Flook 176 was controlling, noted that it had not announced a
new principle that inventions in areas not contemplated by Con-
gress would be patentable per se.177 The Court also pointed out
that Flook concerned the patentability of a computer program.
The only channel for patentability of this type of claim was under
the "process" provision of section 101.178 However, Chakrabarty's
claim involved patentability under the "manufacture"'179 and
"composition of matter" provisions.180 The Flook Court limited
its holding by saying that "very simply our holding today is that a
claim for an improved method of calculation even when tied to a
specific end use, is unpatentable subject matter under section
174. 100 S. Ct. at 2208-12. See notes 9 and 10 supra.
175. Id. at 2210.
176. See note 16 supra.
177. 100 S. Ct. at 2211. The Court attempted to show that there were areas
which the Congress knew could not be foreseen. Therefore, the creation of a
broad statute, such as § 101, could satisfy both the constitutional intent and still
secure a procedure for protection.
178. See note 72 supra.
179. See note 35 supra.
180. See note 40 supra.
101."181 Since the Chakrabarty's claim did not involve a
"method," Flook was not controlling law in this case. The only
commonality between Chakrabarty and Flook was that they both
involved patentability under section 101. The difference, stated by
the lower court in its "door and key" analogy, was that
Chakrabarty dealt .with claims involving sections 102 and 103,
which were all held valid, while Flook only involved an unsuc-
cessful claim under section 101.182
The Chakrabarty majority went on to state that a statute is not
to be confined only to the specific applications considered by Con-
gress at the time it was adopted, and that "a rule that unantici-
pated inventions are without protection would conflict with the
core concept of the patent law that anticipation undermines pat-
entability."183 The Court reasoned that congressional intent evi-
denced a desire that the statutory language be used broadly
precisely because certain inventions would be unforeseeable.1 84
In Kendall v. Winsor,185 the Supreme Court stated that the policy
of the patent laws was, "to promote the progress of science and
the useful arts, contemplating and necessarily implying their ex-
tension, and increasing adaptation to the uses of society."'186
The Bergy II court believed that section 101 and its precedessor
statutes were broadly drawn to encompass unforeseeable future
developments.1 87 Additionally, the intent, as well as the wording
of the statutes negate limitations, so long as there was a new and
useful result.188 The Bergy II court believed that the language
Congress chose to use clearly brought both claims in Bergy and
Chakrabarty within the statute, and to insist on specific congres-
sional foresight in subject matter under section 101 would be the
very antithesis of the constitutional and congressional purpose of
stimulating newly created technology.189 However, the dissent in
the Bergy 11 agreed with the Government's arguments that Deep-
south and Flook were controlling and that where there was sub-
stantial doubt that the courts were to wait for a clear and certain
181. 437 U.S. at 595 n.18.
182. 596 F.2d at 965.
183. 100 S. Ct. at 2211. See also Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 12-17
(1965).
184. Id.
185. 62 U.S. (21 How.) 322, 328 (1859).
186. Id.
187. 596 F.2d at 974.
188. See Dennis v. Pitner, 106 F.2d 142, 144 (7th Cir. 1939), cert. denied, 308 U.S.
606 (1939). But see Hobbs v. United States, 451 F.2d 849. (5th Cir. 1971) (patent
construction is seldom a matter of pure liberalism, but involves inquiry into the
means, operation, and result).
189. 596 F.2d at 973.
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signal from Congress on the subject.190 Still, the Bergy II major-
ity asserted that the correct interpretation of Deepsouth was evi-
dent from the Deepsouth opinion, which frowned upon expanding
patent rights by overruling or modifying prior case law construing
the patent statutes.191 Since Bergy and Chakrabarty were cases
of first impression, they were not at odds with established prece-
dent.
Because the Bergy decision would not change the existing law
or any right conferred by Congress, the court believed that fur-
ther signals from Congress were not needed. 192 The Supreme
Court agreed with this conclusion, stating that the Court had "fre-
quently observed that a statute is not confined to the particular
application. . . contemplated by legislators."' 193
The Court, in denying the Government's argument, noted that
there was vigorous support for patentability of living things pre-
ceding the Chakrabarty decision. In Guaranty Trust' Co. of New
York v. Union Solvents Co. ,194 the court stated that if the patent
was solely for bacteria, a different result would be reached. How-
ever, in the course of its opinion, the Guaranty Trust court re-
jected the defendant's argument that the claims were
unpatentable because they simply involved a life process of a liv-
ing organism.195 The facts of the Guaranty Trust case are strik-
ingly similar to the facts in Chakrabarty in that the inventor was
producing a particular species of bacteria that would produce bu-
tyl alcohol and acetone in commercial quantities better than any
known bacteria, while also inventing the process of successfully
using the bacteria. Furthermore, there have been several bacte-
rial sewerage treatment cases which held that the use of living
bacteria can give rise to a valid process patent. 96 It seemed irra-
tional to suggest that the existence of life in a "manufacture"
claim removed the claim from section 101 while the use of life in a
"process" was patentable subject matter. There was nothing in
190. Id. at 999. See note 140 supra and accompanying text.
191. 596 F.2d at 966.
192. Id. at 967. The Government believed that since Congress saw the need to
pass separate Plant Patent Acts, this implied that Congress did not intend living
things to be statutory subject matter under § 101.
193. 100 S. Ct. at 2211.
194. 54 F.2d 400 (1931).
195. Id. at 410. This holding typified the growing attitudes of the courts. It
seemed to be only a matter of time before the granting patents for living orga-
nisms under §§ 102 and 103 would occur.
196. See note 114 supra and accompanying text.
the wording of section 101 which excluded patents for living orga-
nisms. 197 The Chakrabarty Court noted that microorganisms had
long been important tools in the chemical industry and, as long as
the claim complied with conditions for patentability, there was no
reason to deprive its inventor patent protection simply because
the claim was alive. Since the law already recognized the patent-
ability of products of microbiological processes, 198 there seemed
to be no sound reason why microorganisms could not qualify for
protection.
Finally, in addressing the public benefit rationale for including
microorganisms under section 101,199 the Bergy I dissent stated
that this rationale may be of interest to an appropriate congres-
sional committee, but it had no relevance to the court's determi-
nation of congressional intent.20 0 However, the Chakrabarty
Court squarely disagreed with this argument. Citing Marbury v.
Madison,201 the Court noted that once Congress had spoken, it
was the province and the duty of the judiciary to interpret the
law.202 Hence, the Court found that the patent statutes were
broad enough in their terms to fulfill both the statutory and con-
stitutional goals 20 3 of the promotion of the arts and sciences.
2. The Plant Patent Acts Argument
The final argument of the Government rested on the enactment
of the 1930 Plant Patent Act2o4 and the 1970 Plant Variety Protec-
tion Act.20 5 The Government claimed that passage of these acts
was evidence that Congress never intended living things to be in-
cluded under the "manufacture" and "composition of matter" cat-
egories of section 101.206 The Supreme Court rejected the
Government's argument. The Court found the Government's con-
tention, that Congress intended living things not be included as
section 101 subject matter, unsupportable because Congress rec-
ognized there were only distinctions between products of nature
197. 563 F.2d at 1038-39. But see In re Mancy, 499 F.2d 1289 (C.C.P.A. 1974).
198. See note 114 supra.
199. 563 F.2d at 1041.
200. Id.
201. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
202. 100 S. Ct. at 2210.
203. Id. at 2211.
204. See 100 S. Ct. at 2208-09 n.7 and note 9 supra.
205. See 100 S. Ct. at 2208-9 n.7 and note 10 supra.
206. Congress explained that the Acts assisted the work of a plant breeder "in
aid of nature." Also, the Plant Act relaxed a written requirement of description in
favor of a reasonably possible description. The Government's basis for exclusion
under § 101 was formed from a statement by the Secretary of Agriculture to the
effect that patent laws at that time were understood to include only inventions and
discoveries in the field of inanimate nature.
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and man-made inventions, 207 but no such distinction existed be-
tween living and inanimate objects. The Plant Variety Protection
Act of 1970 did not support the Government's position because
the Act merely extended the protection of the 1930 Plant Patent
Act and nothing in the 1970 Act's language precluded living things
from coverage in section 101.208
VI. THE DISSENT
The Chakrabarty dissent 209 noted strong congressional intent
that favored exclusion of bacteria from patentability under sec-
tion 101. The dissent believed the majority had misread the appli-
cable legislation. The dissent viewed the patent laws as an
attempt to harmonize the antipathy towards monopolies with the
need to encourage progress. 210
In quoting Deepsouth, the dissent was partial to the view that
absent any explicit legislative direction, the courts should leave
the privilege of expanding patent protection to Congress. 2 11 The
dissent further stated that in the area of patent law there was not
the degree of legislative vacuum that the majority would liked to
have believed existed. Congress had enacted two statutes involv-
ing patent protection for plants. The dissent strongly believed
that these acts evidenced a congressional limitation on patents
which included bacteria. 212 If nothing more, the dissent believed
these acts were clear signals that Congress was aware of the
problem of patenting living organisms,213 and that Congress did
not intend to exclude living organisms from coverage under sec-
tion 101.214
207. See S. REP. No. 315, 71st Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1930).
208. 100 S. Ct. at 2210.
209. The dissent was authored by Justice Brennen who was joined by Justices
White, Marshall, and Powell.
210. 100 S. Ct. at 2213. This observation seems incongruous with the remainder
of the dissent's opinion because the dissent was attempting to show disharmony
between the constitutional and statutory mandates and the treatment of these
mandates by the courts.
211. 100 S. Ct. at 2214. See notes 135 and 138 supra and accompanying text.
212. 100 S. Ct. at 2214. See note 190 supra and accompanying text.
213. 100 S. Ct. at 2214 n.2.
214. Id. at 2214. The dissent, in their persistence to point out the controlling in-
fluence of the Plant Acts, never cited strong authority for this proposition. Appar-
ently the dissent assumed the Plant Acts controlled since bacteria could be
characterized more closely as a plant than as a "manufacture" or a "composition
of matter." See notes 35 and 40 supra and accompanying text.
This also was the basic assertion of the Bergy II dissent, which
believed that the 1970 Plant Patent Act specifically excluded bac-
teria from its coverage. 215 On this point, the Chakrabarty dissent
noted, "It is true there is no legislative history of the exclusion,
but that does not give us license to invent reasons." 216 Therefore,
both the Chakrabarty and Bergy dissents believed that Congress
never intended that plants or other organisms be within the scope
of section 101, and unless this was the case, the dissents believed
the 1930 Plant Patent Act would be superfluous. 217
The Court majority rejected these views by stating that the
plant acts were passed exclusively for the benefit of agriculture.
Specifically, the 1930 and 1970 Plant Patent Acts2 18 applied to as-
sexually reproduced plants. 21 9 A leading case interpreting the
Plant Patent Act of 1930 is In re Anzeberger,220 where the Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit was asked to decide whether Con-
gress intended to include in the term "plant" all organic matter,
specifically bacteria. The term bacteria was not in any of the re-
ports in the Plant Acts. It was held that the purpose of the Plant
Act was "to afford agriculture, so far as practicable, the same op-
portunity to participate in the benefits of the patent system as has
been given industry .... The bill will remove the existing dis-
crimination between plant developers and industrial inventor."22 1
The court noted that, according to the Committee on Patents
Report,222 the Plant Acts enabled young agriculturists to take ad-
vantage of an opportunity for profitable invention while farmers
and the general public would be able to obtain improved plants at
a moderate cost.223 The Arzeberger court also, in reference to the
report, asserted that it was clear that Congress wished to extend
the patent system to a nonindustrial area.224
Finally, the Anzeberger court believed that the word "plant"
was being used in its popular sense and not in its scientific sense
215. See note 9 supra.
216. 100 S. Ct. at 2214.
217. 596 F.2d at 1000. The Bergy II dissent's usage of the "superfluous" argu-
ment was unsound because there was no evidence that the Plant Acts were
designed to cover bacteria.
218. See notes 9 and 10 supra.
219. 596 F.2d at 981.
220. 112 F.2d 834 (C.C.P.A. 1940) (involved the application of a patent for a spe-
cies of bacteria useful for producing butyl alcohol, acetone, and ethyl alcohol when
grown in a suitable medium).
221. Id. at 836; See also Yoder Bros. v. California-Florida Plant Corp., 537 F.2d
1347 (5th Cir. 1976).
222. See H.R. REP. No. 1127, 71st Cong., 2d Sess. 138 (1930); 596 F.2d at 982.
223. See 112 F.2d at 836-38 for a purview of the House Committee Reports.
224. Id. at 837.
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within the Act.225 The court indulged in a clever analogy:
A drop of water may contain thousands of bacteria, but outside of scien-
tific circles a drop of water would not be regarded as containing thousands
of plants .... So here we think that Congress in the use of the word
'plant' was speaking in the common language of the people and did not
use the word in its strict, scientific, sense.2 2 6
The Arzeberger court, therefore, believed that Congress in-
tended that an award of patent protection in this area would ben-
efit the agricultural community and that the Act's reference to the
term "plants" was restricted so that it would not encompass other
forms of living matter such as bacteria.227
VI. IMPACT
A. Areas for Concern
In analyzing the possible effects of this case on the scientific
and legal community, the Bergy 11 court characterized the Gov-
ernment's overreaction to a valid patent of microbacteria as
"chicken little" telling everyone that the sky is falling. The Gov-
ernment's petition for certiorari stated that a favorable decision
for the patentee would open an "enormous range of subject mat-
ter to patentability . . . , [and] unless [the decision was] re-
versed, the policy problems of genetic engineering already
controversial, [would] be further complicated by crystalized pat-
ent considerations." 228 There also was a concern over the impact
that the decision would prematurely unleash relatively unex-
plored technology. The People's Business Commission 229 en-
visoned deadly bacteria and contaminated gene pools. They
believe genetic engineering could lead to dangers of an irreversi-
ble nature once engineered organisms were out of the laboratory
and beyond recall.230
The Chakrabarty decision may be viewed by environmentalists
as seriously lacking forethought. One commentator put it this
way: "It is not the court's business to thrash out the broader
225. "Popular sense" refers to how an ordinary person would use the word and
not to the different scientific definitions.
226. 112 F.2d at 838.
227. Id. The majority properly assessed the rationale for the passage of the
Plant Acts. The encouragement given to inventors, through the Patent Acts, was
similarly conferred to agriculturists through the passage of the Plant Acts.
228. 596 F.2d at 985.
229. This organization is presently a consumer-lobby group in Washington, D.C.
230. Washington Post, June 17, 1980, § A, at 5, col. 1.
questions raised by critics of genetic engineering such as the dan-
gers of new organisms escaping control and creating environmen-
tal hazards."23 1 This area for concern will be an ever present
argument against patenting living organisms. The possibility of
these organisms reacting, in an unknown and untested manner,
with other organisms could be substantially detrimental to the
environment. 232 This may well be the best argument against the
Chakrabarty decision. However, the gains appear to outweigh
this speculation. An oil spill is a very costly hazard in terms of
permanent damage to the environment and in terms of dollars.
By encouraging the science of controlling these oil spills by
means of patent protection, a very real benefit to the environment
will result.
There is always concern that this decision occurred too early in
light of what is known about genetic research, and that the dan-
gers are too substantial to presently protect this type of re-
search. 233 However, this view has presented no evidence that
confirms such fears.234
B. Benefits for Patent Protection
The advantages of this patent protection are numerous. It will
obviously give a helpful boost to the fledgling genetic engineering
industry.235 It will offer the prospect of advances in many areas,
such as medicine, food production, and alternative energy
forms. 23 6 It certainly increases the likelihood that DNA research
will become a high-growth industry.237 It is possible a new indus-
trial revolution will result.238 Large corporations, such as General
Electric and Standard Oil, have been joined by a new array of or-
ganizations such as Bidgen, Genex, and Gene-Tech. 239
The greatest impact arising from this decision could be in the
future. Recent discoveries in DNA have opened up the possibility
of producing numerous genetically engineered substances of
great value. 240 Patenting living matter could mean that compa-
nies will find it faster and easier to market new foods.241 It could
even mean less dependence on oil in the manufacture of plastics
231. Washington Post, July 29, 1980, § H, at 1, col. 3.
232. Id.
233. Wall St. J., June 17, 1980, at 15, col. 2.
234. SCIENCE, April 4, 1980, at 32.
235. SCIENCE, June 27, 1980, at 1445.
236. TimE, June 30, 1980, at 52.
237. Washington Post, June 22, 1980, § H, at 1, col. 4.
238. Washington Post, July 18, 1980, § A, at 22, col. 1 and 2.
239. Washington Post, July 7, 1980, § A, at 5, col. 3.
240. Washington Post, June 17, 1980, § A, at 5, col. 4.
241. Washington Post, July 18, 1980, § A, at 1, col. 2.
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and antifreeze. 242
There were over 100 patent applications awaiting the outcome
of this decision.243 Such applications involved, for example, insu-
lin, and hormones that prevent dwarfism. 244 Mining companies
had organisms that would eat metals or that would eat away the
salt in ore.245 Some laboratories are researching genes in wheat
that will need less water to grow.246 In the medicine field, re-
search is close to production of interferon, an antyiral protein that
could be effective against several types of cancer.247
The business community can also benefit from the Chakrabarty
decision. More companies are sure to invest their money into bio-
technology with the assurance of patent protection. 248 There are,
of course, the possible dangers to commercial exploitation. Too
rapid commercial application of new techniques might lead to
tragic mistakes. 249 Scientists may be cautious about sharing in-
formation, or keep their discoveries out of circulation until they
obtain a patent for it.250
There has been some comment that this decision will have little
affect on the industry.2 51 This may be due to the ease with which
genetic engineers will be able to circumvent patents by using sim-
ilar but not identical processes. This argument also notes that the
speed with which a technical art would change would give little
value to patent protection.25 2 Some biotechnologists think the de-
cision will only be a psychological boost for the field.253
There will be, of course, certain legal implications from this de-
cision. The Chairman of Genex Corporation summed it up best.
"One thing is sure: our legal fees wil be going up."254 To state
that the patent law field might expand and become more lucrative
242. Id.
243. Id. at 8, col. 1.
244. Id.
245. Id. at col. 2.
246. Washington Post, June 17, 1980, § A, at 5, col. 1.
247. TIME, June 30, 1980, at 52.
248. BUSINESS WEEK, June 30, 1980, at 48. Nelson M. Schneider, Vice President
at E.F. Hutton and Co., estimates that private capital in this area will reach $200
million this year and $1.9 billion by 1985.
249. Washington Post, July 18, 1980, § A, at 22, col. 2.
250. TIME, June 30, 1980, at 53.
251. Washington Post, June 30, 1980, § H, at 3, col. 1.
252. Id.
253. BUSINESS WEEK, June 30, 1980, at 48.
254. Washington Post, June 30, 1980, § H, at 1, col. 4.
for patent lawyers would be an understatement. Some lawyers in
the field believe this ruling clears away some ambiguity in the
law, and that a contrary decision could have set back develop-
ment in new technologies. 255 Certainly there will be efforts to cir-
cumvent the patents held by others. It would be difficult to show
the uniqueness of one microbe as opposed to another. Some have
called this -decision the "Patent Lawyers Employment Act of
1980."256 There certainly will be overlapping claims that will be
fiercely litigated. A question the Chakrabarty decision has left
open concerns the classification of the progeny of these man-
made organisms. Are they to be considered man-made and pat-
entable or natural and unpatentable? 257 Questions, such as these
will presumably be answered by Congress, the federal Patent Of-
fices, or the courts. 258
VII. CONCLUSION
Policy decisions concerning patent laws in new fields of tech-
nology are not the province of the courts, but, rather, of Con-
gress. 25 9 This case, however, required an interpretation of an
existing but ambiguous policy. The Chakrabarty Court was per-
forming a valid judicial function in deciding that living organisms
were patentable. The decision was congruent with the constitu-
tional mandate to promote the arts and sciences and if Congress
is so fearful of organisms produced by genetic engineering, then
section 101 should be amended to exclude such organisms. 260
Our founding fathers could not have possibly foreseen that we
would walk on the moon or develop computer circuits not visible
to the naked eye. Advances in microorganism technology are re-
cent developments whereby man has created a new and useful
art. With this in mind, the Supreme Court properly did not limit
the patent laws with conditions which the Congress had not ex-
pressed.
Some will be pessimistic about this decision, emphasizing that
the dangers outweigh the promises. In contrast, optimists will
agree with Shakespeare that "we know what we are, but know not
what we may be." This could become the epitaph of the modern
world if present biological achievements become future scientific,
legal, and political problems.261 However, instead of viewing the
255. Wall St. J., June 17, 1980, at 15, col. 2.
256. TIME, June 30, 1980, at 53.
257. BUSINESS WEEK, June 30, 1980, at 48.
258. Id.
259. 596 F.2d at 987.
260. 596 F.2d at 975.
261. Washington Post, June 22, 1980, § D, at 7, col. 6.
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possible consequences of the Chakrabarty decision from a biased
perspective, one should be mindful that science promises truth,
not peace of mind.262 Thus, opinions, whether scientific, legal, or
commercial, should be reserved until the truth has, in fact, been
ascertained.
DENNIS J. WALSH
262. Id.

